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ABSTRACT 
A few years before the development of endogenous growth theory, Eaton's article in the Review of 
Economic Studies provided a suitable framework of analysis to study policy-related issues in stochastic 
endogenous growth model. In this paper, we highlight the analytical core of the model, completing the 
original discussion and showing directions for possible extensions and generalizations. The main 
advantage of a portfolio approach to growth and policy analysis consists of pointing out the equilibrium 
relations between fiscal policy, rates of return and portfolio composition. The financial counterpoint of 
alternative fiscal policies highlighted by Eaton's model thus makes us aware of additional degrees of 
freedom in fiscal and financial engineering, which logically complement the traditional analysis of 
intertemporal optimal taxation. 
KEY WORDS: Endogenous Growth, Risk, Asset Pricing 
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1. Introduction. 
More than ten years ago, from the pages of the Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Jonathan Eaton proposed an interesting way of analyzing long-run effects 
of fiscal policies in a Merton-type stochastic growth model including both private 
capital and government bonds (Eaton [1981]). Since then, growth theory has evolved 
in such a way that an appropriate development of this original contribution may 
come in handy as a suitable framework to analyze both policy-related and financial 
issues in the process of capital accumulation. Our generalization of Eaton's model 
has already proven to be insightful in a number of applications. A series of 
companion papers explores issues in government spending and growth (Corsetti 
[1991a]), taxation and risk-taking (Corsetti [1991b]) as well as in inflation and 
growth (Corsetti and Pesenti [1991c]). Related work by Turnovsky can also be 
considered part of the same literature (see for example Turnovsky [1990]). 
In view of its potential usefulness, it is unfortunate that Eaton's original 
contribution does not provide an explicit treatment of a number of model-related 
issues. First, it provides little intuition about the analytical core of the model. 
Second, it does not carry out welfare analysis, nor does it address the question of 
determining an optimal policy. Finally, it does not explore some important 
properties of the class of competitive equilibria under consideration. The goal of this 
paper is to complete Eaton's discussion of the model, re--casting it from the vantage 
point of the current debate in growth theory, as well as to provide some suggestions 
for possible extensions and generalizations. 
The most apparent simplifying assumption of Eaton's model was certainly not 
greatly welcomed at the time of its publication. The production function is assumed 
to be linear in capital, while capital is the only factor of production. That is, 
output is produced with a s<H:alled AK technology, where A is a linear 
coefficient and K is the capital stock outstanding in the economy. The 
fundamental objection to this kind of model used to be that it does not account for 
2 
the distribution of income between capital and labor, as we perceive it empirically. 
Nonetheless, what has happened in the field of growth theory since the publication of 
Eaton's article has certainly weakened the above criticism. Beginning with the 
contributions by Romer [1986] and Lucas [1988], the debate on growth issues has 
increasingly focused on the role of human capital, sometimes modelled as a close 
substitute for physical capital. In this sense, the meaning of capital has been 
progressively extended so as to include embodied and disembodied knowledge as well. 
Moreover, as is well known, this shift in focus has been historically associated with a 
strong statement regarding production in the growth process. The research agenda 
under the name of endogenous growth {EG) theory relies on production functions in 
which the marginal product of accumulated inputs is sufficiently bounded away from 
zero, so that the Inada conditions do not hold {Kurz [1968], Jones and Manuell 
[1990] and, for the case of two capital goods, see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin [1991]). 
Since a linear technology is the simplest specification with this characteristic, AK 
models have become increasingly popular in the endogenous growth literature. They 
permit the construction of clear-cut analytical schemes especially suited to study 
long-run effects of fiscal and financial policies, which was exactly the main goal 
pursued by Eaton in his 1981 paper (see Rebelo [1991]). Having come full circle, we 
believe that it is worthwhile to revisit Eaton's construction and try to understand 
the scope of its applicability to relevant policy issues in the current debate. 
In Eaton's model the linear coefficient in the production function is not 
constant, but is distributed as a brownian motion with drift. The analysis thus 
belongs to a class of rational expectation, stochastic models that, together with Eaton 
[1981], have also been developed by Gertler and Grinols [1982], Cox, Ingersoll and 
Ross [1985], and Stulz [1986]. While the logical link of all these models with the 
EG literature is in the form of the production function, modelling shocks in the form 
of brownian motion ideally relates them to Merton's stochastic growth analysis. 
However, there is an important difference. In the early literature on stochastic 
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growth, the central focus was the existence and uniqueness of a steady state 
distribution for capital and consumption per worker. In the EG models, the steady 
state is characterized in terms of stationary growth rates, rather than stationary 
levels of these variables. 
Eaton analyzes the consequences of alternative ways of financing government 
spending when this is some given linear stochastic function of the capital stock. In 
the absence of lump-sum taxes, tax policies directly affect the expected yield and 
riskiness of private capital relative to government debt, changing incentives to invest 
and the rate of capital accumulation. As the model assumes that government 
spending is some given linear function of capital, such a specification could model 
either a policy rule or a Leontief technology in capital and public goods: there will 
be some minimum expenditure on public goods per unit of capital which is needed to 
run the production process. Under both interpretations, it is apparent that the 
design of an optimal policy will require the availability of non-lump-sum taxes, to 
complement the spending-induced distortions in the economy. When there is a. fixed 
required ratio of public spending to capital, the decision to invest one additional unit 
of output by the private agents leads to higher government spending. If private 
agents take public spending as independent of their own decisions, a tax on capital 
income can make them assess correctly the implications of their investment behavior. 
So, an important (but originally unstated) conclusion of Eaton's analysis is the 
optimality of non-lump sum taxes1. This, as well as many other results in our 
paper, refers to the logical core of the literature on optimal fiscal and financial policy 
in growth models (see for example Buiter [1990,1991), Chamley [1986), Chari, 
Christiano and Kehoe [1991], Jones, Manuelli and Rossi [1991] King and Rebelo 
[1990), Lucas [1990) and Zhu [19901). However, it should be stressed that the major 
point of interest consists in the framework of analysis. In the tradition of Merton's 
1 The case of a Leontief technology is discussed extensively in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi 
[1991]. Eaton's original formulation, which we follow, better describes the case of a 
policy rule. 
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[1969,1975] seminal contributions, modeling productivity shocks as brownian motions 
allows us to exploit the theoretical body of modern financial theory to address 
macroeconomic issues in general equilibrium. In particular, many endogenous growth 
models discuss specifications including public goods as well as external effects in 
production. The last section of this paper will provide an example of how Eaton's 
construction can be applied to these models. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 will present the structure 
of the economy and characterize an equilibrium allocation as in Eaton [1981]. The 
following two sections are devoted to the comparative statics of tax reforms and to 
the determination of an optimal policy. These sections will highlight some properties 
of the model which are not discussed in Eaton's paper, such as the existence of an 
equivalence class of policies which support the same real allocation, the existence of 
an optimal policy based on non-lump-sum taxation which supports the first-best 
allocation, and the optimality of a zero debt to capital ratio. Section 7 will present 
a graphir.a.1 interpretation of the main results of the analysis. Finally, the flexibility 
of the analytical framework will be illustrated by introducing an external effect of 
capital on labor productivity. Some concluding remarks will close the paper. 
2. Eaton's Model of Stochastic Endogenous Growth. 
2.1 Preferences and Technology. 
The economy is populated with many identical, infinitely-lived households, 
characterized by a time-separable, power utility function in consumption only 
00 C(t )l-R_l(2.1.1) l-R exp(-6t )dt t5>0, RE(O,oo)E0 J0 
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t=O, C(t) is 
the instantaneous consumption rate at time t, R is the elasticity of marginal utility 
and t5 the rate of time preference, positive by assumption. 
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The production function is assumed to be linear in one reproducible factor, 
hereafter K(t). This is some broad measure of capital which includes disembodied 
knowledge, non-human and human capital, the latter being the result of past 
investment ( education and training, for example), to the same extent that physical 
capital is. 
The linear coefficient of K(t) in the production function is not constant, but 
follows a Brownian motion with drift: instantaneous output is subject to an 
economy-wide productivity shock entering the production function in a multiplicative 
way. For the sake of notational consistency, denote instantaneous stochastic flows 
with dZ(t), where Z(t) will indicate the cumulative value of the corresponding 
variable. Thus, denoting with Y(t) cumulative net output, the instantaneous 
output flow net of depreciation can be expressed as: 
(2.1.2) dY(t) [11dt+trdw(t)] K(t) 
where dw(t) is a standard Wiener process with zero mean and unit variance, 1/ 
and tr are positive constants which denote the instantaneous drift and the 
instantaneous standard deviation of productivity shocks, respectively. As in Cox, 
Ingersoll and Ross [1985], depreciation is stochastic and we cannot rule out the 
possibility of observing negative and unbounded instantaneous output flows2. In each 
instant, the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of dY depends on the 
existing capital stock. Therefore, current shocks will have long lasting effects on the 
output process to the extent that they affect capital accumulation over time. 
However, the linearity of the production function implies that the rate of return on 
2capital will be i.i.d. with mean 1/ and variance tr . Finally, investment is 
assumed to entail no adjustment costs, and the capital good can be consumed. 
However, a relatively large ratio between the drift and the standard deviation of the 




2.2 The Government. 
The government is assumed to consume a time-invariant, deterministic fraction 
g of the outstanding capital3: 
(2.2.1) G(t)dt - gK(t)dt _ g71K(t)dt 
where, for convenience, we define g =g714. Government expenditure is financed 
either by tax revenues or by issuing government bonds. Assume an instantaneous 
net tax function of the form 
(2.2.2) dT(t) - rdY(t)+atrK(t)dw(t) - [rrJdt+(r+a)udw(t)] K(t). 
T(t) denotes cumulative net taxes, r is a time-invariant tax rate and a is a 
time-invariant rate at which the government subsidizes (for a<O) or taxes (for a>O) 
capital owners contingent on the realization of the output process 5. Notice that, 
when r+a=O, net tax revenues will be totally insulated from productivity shocks, 
while capital income will be taxed at a flat rate when a=O. 
3 In this paper, government expenditure has been linked to the existing capital stock in 
the economy. Alternatively, it could have been specified as a function of output (in the 
absence of uncertainty, the two specifications would be equivalent). For example, Eaton 
[1981] poses 
dG(t) = g71K(t)dt + g'trK(t)dw(t). 
In this case, however, the presence of a contingent component of government spending (at 
the rate g') raises the possibility of a negative dG(t) to complement the negative dY(t). 
4 In Eaton [1981), the government consumption process is given an institutional 
interpretation. However, in the spirit of the renewed interest in the literature about the 
effects of government spending on production, we could ha.ve similarly modeled a Leontief 
technology in capital and public goods, where G(t)dt is the minimum provision of 
public goods needed to run a given amount of capital in the economy. As an example 
of such public good, which by assumption is produced with the same technology as the 
private good, we could consider government activities to enforce contracts and property 
rights. 
5 "Such a differential tax rate will arise if, for instance, the government explicitly coinsures 
risky undertakings in a degree beyond that implied by the average tax rate" Eaton [1981): 
p.437. 
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When a given policy involves budget deficits, the government finances them by 
issuing consols paying an instantaneous coupon rate of u units of output. Denote 
with B(t) and qB(t) the number of consols in the economy and their price in 




with qB(t) denoting capital gains on bond holding. By the solvency constraint of 
the public sector, the value of qB(t)B(t) will equal the present discounted value of 
future primary surpluses (i.e. spending minus tax revenue). Differing from Eaton 
[1981], in our analysis we do not restrict B( t) to being exclusively positive, i.e. the 
government can be a net creditor vis-a-vis private agents. In this case, public 
expenditure will be partly financed through income from government financial assets, 
instead of using revenue from taxation. 
Throughout this paper, we also assume that the government is able to 
precommit itself to some given policy, announced and immediately effective at t=O, 
so that we will not address policy-related time-consistency issues. 
3. The Competitive Equilibrium. 
In this section, we will characterize the competitive equilibrium allocation 
conditional on given policy parameters. The decentralized economy is characterized 
by two perfectly competitive financial markets: the capital market and the 
government bond market. With the consumption good being the numeraire, Eaton 
writes private financial wealth in real terms7 as 
6 The government budget identity can be derived from the discrete case as shown in 
Merton [1969] (in Merton [1990] :124-126). See also Ingersoll [1987], p.272. 
7 It is important to keep in mind that in Eaton's model taxes are non lump.-sum. 
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(3.1) W(t) _ K(t) + qB(t)B(t) 
and characterize its evolution over time as follows. Each rate of return, including 
both income and capital gains, can be broken down into an anticipated and an 
unanticipated component. Since by assumption technological shocks are the only 
source of uncertainty in the economy, the unanticipated component of returns will be 
function of these shocks. In the case of government consols, we can conjecture that 
in equilibrium they will be characterized by the following linear additive form 
(3.2) udt + 
qB(t) 
with rB(t) and o-B(t)8 being endogenously determined; by the same token, we 
define the after-tax return on equity shares dys9 as 
(3.3) 
Denoting with n(t) the share of capital in wealth and assuming that agents 
consume at the non-stochastic rate C(t) (Merton [1969j), the process of wealth 
accumulation can then be described as 
Consistently, relative to the value of bonds, K(t) is the present discounted value of the 
current and future flow of after-taz income accruing from this asset. 
8 Throughout the paper, we will denote by O"i the covariance between the variable i 
and the Wiener process dw. 
9 In the case of capital shares, the underlying assumptions of our model imply that 
dividends and capital gains are taxed at the same rate r while unanticipated output is 
taxed or subsidized at the rate a. Under these conditions r and u are 
s s 
independent of the dividend policy adopted by the representative competitive firm. 
9 
(3.4) dW(t) - n(t)W(t) [rg{t)dt+o"s(t)dw(t)] + 
+ [1-n(t)]W(t) [rB(t)dt + aB(t)dw(t)] - C(t)dt. 
Therefore, the consumer problem is to choose both an optimal consumption plan and 
an optimal portfolio plan, solving 
( )1-R
(3.5) Max E J
w 
C \_R -l exp(-6t)dt0{C ,n} o 
subject to (3.4), to the initial conditions K(O) = K>O and B(O) = B10, as well as to 
the non-negativity constraint C(t)~O. In addition, private sector solvency will require 
W(t)~O, while feasibility implies K(t)~O. Assuming that (3.4) is bounded and that 
an interior solution exists, this well known problem 11 yields the following first order 
conditions 
(3.6) C(t) x(t) W(t) 
(3.7) 0 
According to the first condition, at any point in time agents consume at the non 
stochastic rate x(t )dt out of wealth. The second expression is the first-order 
condition for the optimal portfolio share in a standard intertemporal asset pricing 
model, where all returns are perfectly correlated. 
In a perfectly competitive market, firms will equate the rental price of capital 
10 Since we allow for both positive and negative B's, we implicitly assume that the sign of 
B(O) is consistent with the solvency constraint, so that the price of consols is non 
negative. 
11 See Merton (1969) or a textbook in Financial Economics, such as Ingersoll (1987), for 
the derivation of the solutions in the text. Malliaris and Brock (1982) is also a standard 
reference. 
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to its after-tax marginal product. Therefore, by (2.2.2) and (2.3.2), we will have 
(3.8) (1-r)7J 
(3.9) 
We have now all the elements we need in order to characterize the macro-economic 
equilibrium, except one: the rates of return on government bonds expressed as a 
function of other variables and/or parameters in the model. Notice that, as 
consumers can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function and 
all the parameters of the model are time-invariant, we can conjecture that there 
exists a steady state equilibrium where portfolio shares are independent of wealth and 
therefore constant. With time-invariant portfolio shares, each component of financial 
wealth will grow at the same stochastic rate, equal to the rate of capital 
accumulation, as follows from differentiating the definition of both capital share and 
government debt in wealth and dividing through by wealth 
(3.10) 
In our ( conjectured) rational expectation equilibrium with constant tax and spending 
rates, the market value of government debt will be instantaneously scaled up to the 
size of the economic activity. This particular point is best illustrated by replacing 
the government intertemporal budget identity (2.2.3) in (3.10), and rearranging the 
expression so as to obtain 
(3.11) 
11 
(3.12) d~f t~ 1 ] 1/2 ____7!_{i)_aB(t) - [Var [ t ]at + u( r+a) I=n(tJ 
The equilibrium rate of return on bonds can be written as the sum of the rate of 
growth of the economy and the income accruing from tax revenue in excess of 
spending, in terms of capital goods. The first component is demand-driven. It 
accounts for capital gains and losses accruing to investors when they try to adjust 
their portfolios vis-a-vis output shocks as they are reflected in the rate of capital 
accumulation. The second component is simply the income flow from the security. 
Note also that, for a given equilibrium level of C(t)/K(t), the rate of return on 
public debt is independent of the coupon rate u; that is, for given tax and spending 
rates, an increase in u leads to higher rates of debt issue, such that capital losses on 
consols will exactly offset the change in the coupon. Moreover, by comparing "s in 
(3.6) with "B in (3.9), it is apparent that the rate of return on capital can be either 
more or less variable than that on bonds, depending on the sign of r+a. When 
·r+a=O, both rates are equally variable and the supply of bonds is deterministic. 
The government will run a budget surplus (deficit) to the extent that tax revenue, 
r11Kdt, exceeds (falls short of) spending, g11Kdt. Nonetheless, as argued above, 
randomness in the rate of return on consols is induced by private agents' demand in 
the financial market (see Eaton [1981], p. 437-438)12. 
As a final step towards the analytical characterization of the equilibrium, we 
can substitute the mean and variance of each rate of return (rB, rs, aB and as) in 
the first-order condition for the optimal consumption policy and optimal portfolio 
plan, solving for n and X· For reasons which will become clear later, define 'Y 
as a particular combination of fiscal and technological parameters of the form 
(3.13) 'Y =11r-Ru2(r+a). 
12 Adding truces on income from bonds does not modify the analysis. It may help to 
consider the rate of return on bonds as after-truc. 
I . 
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The optimal consumption and portfolio plans can then be expressed as follows 
{3.14) 
{3.15) n(t) 
Indeed, for constant policy parameters, the optimal portfolio shares will not change 
with the level of wealth: in equilibrium n(t)=n is time-invariant and the 
consumption rate is a constant fraction of the existing capital stock. By the same 
token, with constant portfolio shares, both anticipated and unanticipated components 
of returns on assets are independent of calendar time. 
While the amount of risk for each asset depends crucially on fiscal parameters, 
the economy as a whole face an exogenously-given, technology-related social risk 
which cannot be diversified. Thus, when considering the market portfolio held by 
the representative individual ( combining bonds and capital shares with weight 1-n 
and n, respectively), its rate of return 
{3.16) 
will have a constant variance, independent of policy variables. Its expected return, 
however, will be inversely related to 713 . These features also characterize the growt 
rate for the economy. Since portfolio shares are constant, the stochastic growth rate 
for the economy is time-invariant 
!!!ffi} -1 1 2{3.17) 7{(ij = R [1J - 8 - 2 R{l-R)u - 7] dt + u dw{t) 
13 Note also that all rates of return in the economy (bonds, equities and market) coincide 
when T+a=O. 
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and distributed as a brownian motion with drift. As for the return on the market 
portfolio, the variance of this process reflects the social risk in the economy, while 
the deterministic component is inversely related to 7. Finally, the characterization of 
the competitive equilibrium is completed with the determination of shadow riskless 
rate associated with the equilibrium allocation. Following the argument in Eaton 
[1981], it can be shown that this rate is equal to 
(3.18) r = [11 - Ru2 -7]. 
which is clearly a function of both technological and policy-related parameters. 
4. Comparative Statics: Crowding Out, Crowding In and An Equivalence Class of 
Policies. 
The previous section has characterized the equilibrium allocation conditional on 
given policy parameters closely following Eaton's original scheme. In this and the 
next section, devoted to the comparative statics of policy reform and to the 
definition of an optimal policy, we take a major departure from his analysis. A first 
important result, which is not stated in Eaton's original contribution, is the existence 
of an equivalence class of policies which support the same real allocation. By (3.14) 
and (3.15), it is apparent that changing policy parameters without affecting 7 will 
not alter either the portfolio shares or the consumption rate. As an index of 
government fiscal policy, 7 completely captures the effects of alternative policies on 
consumption, capital accumulation, real holding of debt as well as social welfare as 
measured by the representative agent's indirect utility of wealth. By the definition 
of 7 in (3.13), trading-off anticipated and contingent tax rates according to 
2 
(4.1) da = 1]-R~ dr 
Ru 
14 
will determine a continuum of policies supporting the same equilibrium. Notice that 
the rate of return on the market portfolio, the shadow riskless rate and the debt to 
capital ratio also depend on tax parameters only through 7. 
Nonetheless, whether or not 7 varies, any change in the tax rates will be 
reflected in both the budget process and the return on financial assets. Consider 
some equilibrium-preserving, iso-growth and iso-we lfare tax reform conditional on 
a given 7. In our economy, the change in tax rates will affect the return on 
equities. For the optimal portfolio not to change, the rate of return on government 
security must vary too, appropriately offsetting the rise (fall) in the demand for the 
alternative asset. Given the coupon rate u, this will be reflected in the equilibrium 
path for the price of consols {qB(t)}~=o· Since for a fixed 7 the net financial 
position of the government over time {qB(t)B(t)}~=O does not respond to policy 
reforms, the rate of bond issue must adjust accordingly. 
As both the rate of growth (3.17) and the return on the market portfolio (3.16) 
are monotonically decreasing in 7, fiscal reforms can have crowding out as well as 
crowding in effects. Policies increasing 7 will lower the holding of portfolio share in 
capital n, raise consumption for a given level of capital and reduce accumulation. 
Policies decreasing 7 will make the economy grow faster. Each value of 7 will 
also correspond to a particular debt to capital ratio H[7], where H =(1-n))/n. It 
is interesting to note that an increase in the public debt to capital ratio is not 
necessarily associated with lower growth. The derivative of H with respect to 7 
(4.2) ~ = .!. [R(l+H)-H].
u1 X 
will be positive if parameter values are such that R~ 1!~[~ = 1-n[R], negative if 
otherwise. In some limiting cases14, it is possible to obtain an inverse crowding out 
14 It is apparent that, since a positive private sector wealth requires H~-1, the condition 
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effect: for lower values of 7, capital accumulation could be increasing vis-a-vis a 
rising debt to capital ratio15. 
5. Optimal policy. 
Consider now a benevolent government whose objective is to maximize private 
agents' expected utility. In terms of the well-known Ramsey problem, an optimal 
policy consists in choosing tax rates which achieve this goal consistent with 
government consumption and with market determination of prices and quantities. 
One way to characterize a solution is to find a feasible policy which maximizes the 
representative agent's indirect utility of wealth. Considering the equilibrium 
closed-form expression for this function, we can write 
(X[1] +7-g1])1-R
{5.1) Max V[W{O),O] - Max 
1 1 X [ 1] 
By the first-order condition for this problem, the welfare maximizing policy 10 will 
be 
{5.2) 
Notice that the equilibrium demand for government securities can be written as 
{5.3) 1-n 
R~l-n is always satisfied for R~l. However, for values of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion lower than unity, it is possible that parameter values are such that (1-n) is 
larger than R. Notice that in this case the coefficient of relative risk aversion is a lower 
boundary for the share of wealth in public debt. The demand for government bonds 
cannot go below this boundary without inducing a violation of the transversality condition 
for the consumer problem. 
Also, the effect of an increase in the level of technological uncertainty on capital 
accumulation will depend on both the degree of risk aversion and the contingent tax and 
subsidies scheme by the governmeent. See Eaton [1981] for a discussion. 
15 
16 
It is evident that 70 will make the private demand for government bonds equal to 
zero. No government deficit or surplus will then be feasible at an optimum, so that 
there will be no freedom to choose among tax parameters consistent with 'Yo but 
implying a non zero ('T+a). For, while a non zero ('T+a) would make it impossible 
to balance the budget instant by instant, the market will not allow deficit financing. 
Thus, we can write the optimal policy as (g,,,.=g,a=-g,u), where the rate of bond 
issue will be residually determined16. This policy consists in taxing only the 
expected capital income at a positive rate, insulating government revenues from 
instantaneous productivity shocks. 
An alternative and informative way to characterize an optimal policy consists of 
comparing the allocation in a command economy (given the spending rule (2.2.1)) 
with the allocation in the market economy. It can be shown that a social planner 
trying to maximize consumer's utility subject to the resource constraint would 
prescribe agents to consume at a deterministic fraction out of capital equal to 
(5.4) 
16 In the text, we have proceeded by assuming that the fiscal parameters r and a are 
predetermined so that the process governing the issue of government bonds is 
endogenously determined as a function of parameters and technological shocks. Define the 
rate of bond issue as 
dB(t) _ ~ 
B{t) = µBdt + "'Bdw{t) 
By differentiating the definition of a portfolio share n using Ito's lemma, we can write 
the parameters for this process as 
dB{t) dqB(t)] u _ 
µB = rE - rB - cov B{t)' qB(t) /dt + q(t) -[ 
[nJ 2 n 22 u= 1-n (71g-7) + 1-n (r+a) u + q(t) 
~ -n ( )"'B = u - uB = 1-n u r+a 
Given the coupon rate on consols and the rate of government consumption, it can be 
shown that there exists a one-t~ne relationship between any fiscal policy {r,a) and the 
rate of debt issue, as defined by (µB,I:B). Therefore, two out of the four policy variables 
{r,a,JL:B,I:B) are residually determined. 
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If some policy supporting the command optimum exists, it must be such that the 
consumption rate out of capital in the market economy coincides with (5.4).~fHn 
By evaluating (3.14) and (3.15) at 7=70, it is easy to verify that (g,r=g,a=-g,u) is 
indeed the policy we are looking for. 
We then conclude that there exists a policy which can sustain the command 
optimum, and that this policy is associated with a zero debt to capital ratio, so that 
any tax parameters implying either a positive or a negative net financial position for 
the government will produce equilibria which are sub--optimal17 18. 
7. A Graphical Analysis 
The results developed so far can be given an intuitive graphical representation 
in the mean-variance space of asset returns. Consider first a command economy, 
corresponding to Figure 1. If we project the rate of return on capital net of capital 
spending in the mean-variance or, more precisely, in the (E,u) space, this rate will 
correspond to a point Kg with coordinates (77(1-g),u). Since the rate of return on 
capital follows a brownian motion, there is no loss of generality in assuming that 
preferences are locally quadratic. In the (E,u) space, non-satiated risk-averse 
consumers will be characterized by a map of upward sloping indifference curves. 
Now, because in this economy the optimal portfolio obviously consists of capital only, 
the equilibrium will correspond to the representative agent indifference curve passing 
through Kg. The equilibrium riskless rate will correspond to the point at which 
17 The specification of the spending function adopted by Eaton [1981] 
dG(t) = [gf/dt+g'o-dw(t)] K(t) 
differs from our because of a linear contingent component. In this case it is easy to 
show that the optimal policy is (g,g',T=g,a=g'-g), still involving a balanced budget rule. 
18 AB a final remark, cases could be take into account where the the choice of tax rates 
may not be free of constraints. For instance, suppose that for some reason the only 
feasible policy is a flat-rate tax on income with a=O. In this case, there is no constant 
tax rate which permits the economy to attain a command optimum. With a=O, it is 
impossible to balance the budget instant by instant, so that the optimal value of 'Y, 
which makes the private demand for government securities zero, does not correspond to a 
feasible policy. 
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the tangent to the indifference curve at Kg crosses the axis of the expected returns. 
This will determine the only rate such that, if a riskless asset existed, it would be 
neither demanded nor supplied by the representative investor. In Figure 1, the 
riskless rate is denoted by p19. 
Figure 2 and 3 refer to the competitive economy of Section 3. Consider the 
first figure. With only one source of uncertainty in the economy, all rates of return 
are perfectly correlated. In the space of mean/standard deviation of returns we can 
therefore represent portfolios combining different assets with straight segments. 
Define the line connecting any pair of rates of return a frontier F(.). It can be 
easily verified that a frontier F(.) has the following properties: in equilibrium, all 
assets will lie on it; the position of the frontier in the space of Figure 3 is uniquely 
determined by a particular macroeconomic equilibrium; the slope of the frontier is 
(Ro-)-l and does not change across different equilibria. For future reference, focus on 
the debt to capital ratio H and denote a frontier by F(H). 
The position of the rate of return on the market portfolio on F(H) is easy to 
identify: since the social risk is exogenous in our economy, its variance will be 
identically equal to rr. By construction, the market rate will lie on the portfolio line 
connecting the rates of return on bonds and equities. However, it is worth noticing 
that these rates will not necessarily lie on opposite sides with respect to the market, 
as we allow for a negative government debt (i.e. private agents can go short in 
government bonds). 
Figure 3 refers to the crowding-out and crowding-in effects of alternative 
policies. In the figure, we project F(H[7 ]), which coincides with the command 
0 
optimum frontier, together with two possible frontiers for 1>10 and 7<70. By the 
19 The following argument illustrates why p is unique in this economy. Suppose that the 
representative investor faces a riskless rate different from p. Then, she would consider a 
new efficient portfolio frontier connecting A to Kg and would try to move onto the new 
frontier, i.e. to form a portfolio containing a positive amount of the riskless asset. 
However, this cannot be an equilibrium portfolio for the representative agent in an 
economy where the riskless asset does not exist in positive supply. The unique sure rate 
compatible with a portfolio including capital shares only is p. 
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result of the comparative static exercise, gro\~;th will be slower in the first case, 
faster in the second one; F(H[7>70]) will lie to the left, F([1<10]) will lie to the 
right of F(H[70]). Note that, while the standard deviation of the market return 
reflect the given level of social risk <r, its mean is endogenously determined20 • 
8. A simple Extension of the Model: Learning by Doing. 
The goal of this section is to show how the basic structure of the model can be 
used to explore these growth- and policy-related issues in models with externalities 
in the production function. By way of a representative example, consider a 
simplified version of an Arrow-Romer growth model, where the amount of capital in 
the economy has a positive external effects on the productivity of labor (see Romer 
[19861). The private firm will now face a production function with constant return 
to scale in capital and labor, the latter measured in efficiency units: 
(8.1) 
The measure of labor in efficiency units captures the external effect of capital on the 
productivity of workers. Denoting with L(t) the physical units of labor and with C 
the total amount of capital in the economy, we can write J(t) = L(t)C. Assuming 
identical firms, this identity can also be written as J(t) = L(t)N(t)K(t), where N(t) 
is the number of firms in the economy, exogenously given. Thus, the above 
specification implies the presence of scale effects on the nation-wide productivity, a 
feature which is well known in the literature. While at a private firm level the 
return on capital is perceived as decreasing, it is quite apparent that from a social 
20 The metric of the indifference curve map in the (E,<r) space is conditional on a given 
level of wealth. For a given level of wealth, utility increases when moving South-East in 
the diagram. However, in our model wealth is endogenous, and the three frontiers in 
figure 3, drawn for different policies, correspond to different levels of wealth. Therefore, 
we will have a different metric of the map of indifference curve for each particular 
frontier. 
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point of view we are facing exactly the same linear technology as in section 2. 
Posing 1J:NL! and 1T:NLt9, and substituting the definition of J in (8.1), we obtain 
exactly (2.1.2). For the sake of simplicity, we will try to deviate from the 
framework of the analysis laid down in the preceding sections as little as possible. 
We will assume identical preferences as in (2.1.1), which implies that raw labor is 
inelastically supplied. The government is assumed to tax output according to (2.2.2), 
where, however, the spending rate will be normalized to zero. Thus, posing G(t)=O, 
the government intertemporal budget identity (2.2.3) still holds. 
Abstracting from the normalization of government spending, the main difference 
with respect to Eaton's specification consists of, first, privately perceived decreasing 
return on capital and, second, the presence of labor income in the market economy. 
Because of the external effects of capital on labor productivity, we expect a market 
allocation without public intervention to be suboptimal. In particular, investment in 
productive capital will be too low. Provided that the government can raise revenue 
in a non-distortionary way, a policy of investment subsidies can then enhance welfare 
and growth. In what follows, we will re-examine these simple propositions in our 
stochastic economy. 
Given the presence of privately perceived decreasing return on capital, the 
extension of Eaton's solution strategy requires an additional analytical step. In 
particular, consider the present discounted value of the after-tax firm output. This 
can be viewed as the sum of two assets, the first being a claim to the present and 
future flow of after-tax capital income, the second a claim to the present and future 
fl.ow of after-tax labor income. Denoting these assets with S ( equity shares) and E, 
respectively, and assuming the existence of competitive markets for both assets, 
private wealth in terms of the capital good can now be expressed as 
(8.2) 
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where, as before, q's denote asset prices. From this point on, we can simply follow 
the solution strategy outlined in the previous sections. First, with only one source of 
uncertainty in the economy, once again we can conjecture an equilibrium where the 
rates of return on these assets will be in the form ridt+11idw(t) (for i=S,E,B). The 
above specification of wealth and rates of return will allow us to write the consumer 
problem as in section 3, including an additional asset (E) in the budget constraint. 
The first order condition for this problem can be written as 





, nB and ne denote the shares of the three assets in wealth. By the profit 
maximization conditions of a competitive firm, the rate of return on capital will be 
equal to its marginal product: 
(8.6) r/t) - (l-r)(l-P)11 
(8.7) 
while, by the same argument as in section 3, the other rates of return can be easily 







The system of equations provided by the above expressions allows us to solve for the 
equilibrium allocation. In particular, recalling the definition of 7 in ( 4.13), we will 
have: 
(8.12) n = s 
R7 
(8.13) nB = 2 2 
/J(11-R(J )+(1-/J) 7+[8/(l-R)-1J+.5RfJ ] 
(8.14) 
As in Eaton's model, we can easily verify that real allocation will respond only to 
changes in "/, generating the possibility of neutral tax reforms, i.e. variations in the 
fiscal parameters r and a that leave the equilibrium portfolio shares and the 
consumption rate unaffected. The fiscal variable 7 measures the magnitude of the 
tax-distortions in the economy. Increasing 7 makes capital less attractive with 
respect to bonds, depressing capital formation. Decreasing 7 fosters investment and 
growth. 
Because of the capital externality, it is clear that welfar~nhancing policies 
should create incentives for faster capital accumulation. In this sense, it will be not 
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be wise to choose tax rates corresponding to a positive 7 (i.e. to a positive 
certainty equivalent tax rate). Rather, a desirable policy of capital income subsidies 
will require negative 7's. However, how can these subsidies be financed? The 
model suggests a solution well in the tradition of the intertemporal generalization of 
the Ramsey optimal taxation scheme. 
From (8.13), it is apparent that negative 7's make the equilibrium demand for 
government share negative. This implies that the government is a net financial 
creditor in the economy, i.e. it can finance its subsidies by using income accruing 
from its financial assets rather than raising revenue through distortionary taxation. 
The structure of returns ensures that the private sector will be perfectly happy to go 
short on government debt. By the equilibrium conditions, then, the market portfolio 
will reflect the social risk, exogenously given in this economy, and the appropriate 
expected return on the market. 
It could be observed that a negative public debt is effectively equivalent to 
lump-sum taxes. Both allow the government to raise revenue in a non-distortionary 
way. Indeed, a positive net financial position of the government is what the solution 
to the intertemporal taxation problem prescribes. In the Ramsey tradition, a positive 
net financial position is achieved by means of an initial "capital levy", through which 
the government becomes a share holder. In our framework, the government is 
similarly endowed with part of the return on capital, but not as a share holder. In 
principle, negative debt can be issued against a reduction of future tax liabilities at a 
price reflecting the present discounted value of the tax relief. If taxes were 
lump-sum, such a financial transaction would be neutral. Outside the Ricardian 
world, policy neutrality fades away as the tax burden is reduced in trade, with clear 
effects on the real allocation. 
Note that in a command economy, the rate of consumption out of capital is 
still equal to (5.4). An optimal policy can then be identified by equating this 
expression to (8.14). It is apparently verifiable that n =1 is the condition we are s 
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looking for, corresponding to 
(8.15) 
In this first-best equilibrium, the external effect of capital on labor productivity is 
completely internalized, as private wealth coincides with the capital stock. It is also 
easy to verify that the equilibrium demand for government bonds conditional on 7
0 
is negative, according to our previous discussion. 
One may wonder what would be the equilibrium and policy implications of 
alternative tax policies. For example, taxes may be levied on assets income, rather 
then output. Two cases need to be distinguished. In the first one, tax rates do not 
vary across assets. Then, the basic results of the above analysis would still be valid, 
except for the fact that now, for a given capital to wealth ratio, the equilibrium 
shares of B and E in wealth would marginally respond to equilibrium-preserving tax 
reforms. Yet, an optimal policy would require public debt be negative. However, if 
tax rates can differ, it is clear that, as the social marginal contribution to output by 
raw labor is zero, it would be optimal to tax all labor income and use the 
proceeding to finance capital income subsidies (as modeled, for example, by Corsetti 
and Pesenti (1992]). 
9. Conclusions. 
A few years before the development of endogenous growth theory, Eaton's 
article in RES provided a convient framework of analysis to study policy-related 
issues in stochastic endogenous growth model. In this paper, we have highlighted the 
analytical core of the model, completing the original discussion and showing directions 
for possible extensions and generalizations. The main advantage of a Merton-type 
approach to growth and policy analysis consists of pointing out the equilibrium 
relations between fiscal policy, rates of return and portfolio composition. Wealth 
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allocation analysis can thus provide an important complement to alternative models, 
focusing on real variables. 
The fiscal issue underlying Eaton's original contribution is the financing of 
government spending when this is in some given ( deterministic or stochastic) 
proportion to the existing capital stock in the economy. In contrast to the classical 
Ramsey result (as in Chamley [1986]), a policy of balance-budgets with a non zero 
tax rate on capital income can support a first-best allocation in the market economy. 
Also, any non-zero amount of public debt is suboptimal, because of the tax-related 
distortions associated with its servicing. However, as we introduce externalities into 
the production function, the composition of financial wealth in the economy may 
reflect the public sector need of revenue to finance the appropriate policy of 
subsidies. If lump-sum taxes cannot be resorted to, a positive net financial position 
by the government (negative public debt) may be welfare-enhancing. 
The financial counterpoint of alternative fiscal policies highlighted by Eaton's 
model thus makes us aware of additional degrees of freedom in fiscal and fina.ncia.1 
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